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I. INTRODUCTION
N THE PAST decade, major commercial airlines have seen an
increase of in-flight medical emergencies from three per day
in the late 1980s to twenty-nine per day in 1996,1 and it is antici-
pated that the number of those emergencies will continue to
rise. U.S. airlines carried a record 643.3 million passengers in
1998 and traffic growth is predicted to reach almost one billion
by the year 2010.2 With the likelihood of increased numbers of
elderly passengers and those with pre-existing illnesses, the need
to assess the quality of in-flight medical care has become increas-
ingly importantA These statistics have caused concern that the
medical equipment carried onboard airlines and the training
provided to crew members is outdated and inadequate.4
At the beginning of commercial air passenger service in the
late 1920s, Boeing Air Transport required that flight attendants
be registered nurses.5 That requirement changed during World
War II when nursing skills were in demand for the war effort.
No carrier today requires that any crew member be qualified as
a registered nurse, although crew members today are required
to train in the use of the first aid kit and in the handling of
emergency situations.6
I See Susan Okie, Cardiac Arrest in the Air: Without the Tools to Cope; Emergencies
Raise Issue of Airline Preparedness, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al.
2 See Commercial Forecast Reports Seventh Consecutive Year of Aviation Growth, FAA
PRESS RELEASE APA 37.99, March 23, 1999.
3 See Russell B. Rayman, Aerospace Medicine, 279 JAMA 1777 (1998).
4 Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastruc-




6 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.417 (1999). Emergency training includes "[f]irst aid
equipment and its proper use" (§ 121.417(b) (2) (ii)) and instruction in the han-
dling of emergency situations including "[i] llness, injury, or other abnormal situ-
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For many years, air carriers have been required to have ap-
proved first aid kits, accessible to flight attendants, for treatment
of minor injuries or medical emergencies that might occur dur-
ing the flight.' The kits contain many of the items one would
find in a home first aid kit.' (See Attachment A for a list of
Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) required components
in a first aid kit). In 1986, the FAA established regulations re-
quiring air carriers to place emergency medical kits (EMKs)
onboard their aircraft.9 The EMKs, which are only authorized
for use by qualified medical personnel, are more comprehensive
than the first aid kits and include such items as a stethoscope,
blood pressure measuring device, plastic airways to help deliver
oxygen, drugs for allergic reactions, and basic instructions for
use of the drugs.' ° (See Attachment B for the required contents
of the EMK). The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) address-
ing EMKs were amended in 1994 to require the inclusion of dis-
posable latex gloves," and further amended in 1996 to require
medical kits on commuter scheduled operations with passenger
configurations of 10 to 30 seats. 12
In recent years, there has been growing debate, both outside
and within the aviation industry, as to whether the current medi-
cal kits are adequate, particularly for treating heart attack vic-
tims.1 3 Indeed, nitroglycerin tablets are the only medication
ations involving passengers or crewmembers to include familiarization with the
emergency medical kit." § 121.417(b) (3) (iv).
7 See id. § 121.309(d).
8 See id. § 121 app. A (First Aid and Emergency Medical Kits).
9 See Certification and Operations: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Air Car-
riers and Commercial Operators of Large Aircraft, 51 Fed. Reg. 1223 (1986),
which applies to carriers carrying passengers under Part 121 (more than 30 seats)
and under Part 135 (more than 19 seats).
10 See 14 C.F.R. § 121 app. A (First Aid Kits and Emergency Medical Kits).
11 See Hearing, supra note 4.
12 See id.
13 See H. R. REPy. No. 105-456 at 3 (1998). Several distinct conditions comprise
what the public considers to be "heart attacks." Angina chest pain results when
there is insufficient blood flow or oxygen received by the heart muscle. This can
be caused by partial cholesterol blockages in the coronary arteries that supply the
heart. Also, lower levels of oxygen at cabin altitude contribute to less oxygen
getting to the heart in some passengers.
A heart attack, or myocardial infarction, results when a full blockage in the coro-
nary arteries occurs, or the heart muscle is so starved of oxygen that heart muscle
actually dies. The dying heart muscle can cause the heart rhythm to become
extremely erratic and cause blood pressure to fall.
A sudden cardiac arrest is the abrupt cessation of the pumping action of the
heart. It can be due to a heart attack, angina, or other insults to the heart or
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available in the kits for the treatment of cardiac problems. 14
Moreover, not all flight attendants are trained in cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation (CPR) .1 With the majority of in-flight deaths
and most of the medical emergencies attributable to heart con-
ditions, there is a concern to improve both the quality and quan-
tity of in-flight medical training and equipment to better handle
cardiac events.1
6
According to a study of 120 airlines conducted from 1977 to
1984 and published in the Journal of American Medical Associa-
tion in 1988, about 72 deaths occur aboard aircraft each year.17
In many years, this is more than the deaths from airline crashes
in the United States.18 This study indicates that about sixty-
three percent of the deaths were due to sudden, unexpected
lungs. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 69 (Statement of David K. McKenas, M.D.,
M.P.H.).
14 Nitroglycerin treats angina or symptoms of chest pains by relaxing blood
vessels and increasing the supply of blood and oxygen to the heart and reducing
its work load. See MED. ECON. Co., PHYsicINs DESK REFERENCE 2899 (53d ed.
1999). Diphenhydramine (such as brand name Benadryl) is an antihistamine
used on allergic reactions. See id. at 2269. Epinephrine is a bronchodilator that
increases the flow of air into the bronchial tubes and is used to treat severe aller-
gic reactions. See id. at 916.
15 A review of the 26 carriers represented by the Association of Flight Attend-
ants (AFA) shows that each carrier's training for flight attendants is different.
AFA believes that, overall, flight attendants do not receive adequate training in
the most basic first aid necessary to manage a medical emergency in the cabin.
Some of their members receive instruction for less than 30 minutes to a few
hours during their initial training and then during recurrent training every few
years. The FAA only recommends that first aid and CPR be taught. However, no
flight attendant is required to be certified in CPR. In fact, no flight attendant is
required to assist a passenger medically if she/he is uncomfortable with the medi-
cal procedure. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 17-18 (statement of Mary Kay Hanke,
International Vice President of the Association of Flight Attendants).
16 See id. Interestingly, the possibility of preventing death through the applica-
tion of improved medical equipment onboard aircraft also raises other issues if a
"Do Not Resuscitate" order is in place for the passenger. For discussion of these
issues, see Amanda C. Dake, The Application of 'Out-Of-Hospital' Do Not Resuscitate
Order Legislation to Commercial Airlines Travel, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 443 (1997).
17 See H. R. REP. No. 105 456, at 4. MedAire, a company which provides medi-
cal ground support for airlines, also participated in a year long (October 1996-
1997) study of 1,132 in-flight medical emergencies reported by six U.S. airlines
based upon data collected and analyzed by MedAire and the Civil Aeronautical
Institute, University of Oklahoma. SeeJoan Sullivan Garrett, Experience with 1,132
In-flight Medical Emergencies: What Have We Learned?, S. CAL. SAFETY INST., 2-3, Jan.
25, 1999. The data compiled by the study indicated an industry wide rate of
approximately 15 in-flight medical emergencies per day and approximately 60 in-
flight fatalities per year. The most common serious in-flight medical emergen-
cies were cardiac and vasovagal events. See id. at 3.
18 See H. R. REP. No. 105-456, at 4.
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cardiac problems and that the most likely victims were middle-
aged men.19
According to the American Heart Association, more than
1,000 people per day in the United States suffer sudden cardiac
arrest,20 and in most cases, it is not possible to "predict who will
have a sudden cardiac arrest, or where or when it will happen. 21
However, the risk of cardiac arrest apparently increases because
of the special circumstances associated with flying. These cir-
cumstances include the following:22
1. Exertion in getting to the gate;
2. Circadian disruption;
3. Stress of flying;
4. Reduced oxygen (equivalent to 5,500 to 7,500 feet above sea
level);
5. Failure to recognize the event (even though in a public
place); and
6. Delay in reaching a medical facility.
Further, these special circumstances take on added significance
because high risk individuals now have access to air travel. 23
19 See id.
20 See David K. McKenas, M.D., M.P.H., First, Do No Harm: The Role of Defibril-
lators and Advanced Medical Care In Commercial Aviation, 68 AVIATION SPACE &
ENvT. MED. 365 (1997).
21 Id. During flight, the most feared medical emergency is indeed cardiac
arrest-a situation in which breathing and circulation stops. Although cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should be initiated, it is relatively ineffective in
maintaining viability of the heart and brain. See Hearing supra note 4, at 21
(Statement of Joan Sullivan Garrett, President, MedAire, Inc.).
22 See Richard L. Page, M.D., Trans-Thoracic Ventricular Defibrillation: From
Bench To Bedside; From Ambulance To Aircraft Aisle, Internal Medicine Grand
Rounds Syllabus University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas (Oct.
1, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
23 During the Aviation Subcommittee hearings on the act, the impact of Air
Carrier Access Act on the increase in medical emergencies was discussed. Ac-
cording to testimony from the representative of Qantas Airlines, Qantas is able to
screen anyone who is sick or has a recent medical history, and thus there is less
likelihood that someone will die on board one of their aircrafts. See Hearing,
supra note 4, at 28. However, according to Dr. David McKenas, Medical Director
of American Airlines, and Edward Merlis, Vice President of the Air Transport
Association, U.S. carriers cannot perform such screening because of the Air Car-
rier Access Act. See id. at 32. At American Airlines, if a passenger volunteers or
discloses that he or she has a medical problem, the passenger will be referred to a
special assistance coordinator who is a liaison with the medical department.
American Airlines then will make an assessment in regard to whether or not the
passenger is stable for air travel and whether and to what extent extra equipment
will be useful. Instances when boarding is denied usually involves a communica-
ble disease such as chicken pox or meningitis. See id. at 37. However, if the
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In recent years, several foreign air passenger carriers have ex-
panded their medical kits and include defibrillators on their
overseas flights.24 A defibrillator is used to restore normal heart
rhythm by electric shock.25
According to the FAA, the number of incidents of in-flight
medical emergencies cannot be measured accurately because
airlines are not required to report them.26 However, the FAA
Civil Aeromedical Institute reported that "the rate of in-flight
medical emergencies appeared to have nearly doubled between
1990 and 1993, the interval covered by [its] study."27
Most airlines do not keep records of passenger deaths. Ameri-
can Airlines does maintain records of cardiopulmonary resusci-
tations, which is a good indicator of instances when a
defibrillator would be necessary. These records indicate that,
from 1991 through 1996, CPR related incidents onboard aircraft
almost tripled. In 1991, twelve cases of CPR being administered
were reported, while in 1996, some thirty-three cases were
reported.28
Emergency medical systems have been using automatic exter-
nal defibrillators (AEDs) in communities throughout the coun-
try since the mid-1980s. By using a computerized diagnostic
algorithm, the AED analyzes the ECG tracing and attempts to
detect either ventricular tachycardia or ventricular fibrillation.
If the AED detects ventricular fibrillation, it will prompt the user
to deliver a shock, or will automatically deliver the shock itself,
depending upon its design and programming. "Most AEDs in-
clude a memory system to allow for post-event monitoring and
passenger fails to disclose the medical problem, the carrier cannot inquire. See
id.
24 See H. R. REP. No. 105-456 at 3 (1998). These foreign carriers include
Qantas, Virgin Atlantic, and Air Zimbabwe. In 1991, Qantas installed Laerdal
Heartstart 3000 AEDs into its fifty-five international Boeing 747 and 767 aircraft.
For a detailed discussion of the Qantas program, see Michael F. O'Rourke, M.D.,
DSc; et al., An Airline Cardiac Arrest Program, 96 AM. HEART ASS'N CIRCULATION
2849 (1997).
25 See Alex Wolbrink, M.D. & Donato Borillo, M.D.,J.D., Airline Use of Automatic
Defibrillators: Shocking Developments, FED. AIR SURGEON'S MED. BULL., 7 (visited
Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.cami.ccbi.gov/AAM-400A/FASMB/fas9802/
defib.htm> [hereinafter Wolbrink & Borillo].
26 As is discussed herein in section II. B., reporting of medical events was ad-
dressed in the Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 Pub. L. No. 105-170, 112
Stat. 47 [hereinafter AMAA]..
27 H. R. REP. No. 105-456, at 4.
28 See id.
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post-event review of incidents .. . . 9 The newest generation of
the AEDs are compact, lightweight, durable and easy to use.3 °
It has also been urged that the medical kit should include
medications to stabilize the myocardial tissue in addition to
AEDs.3 Also important to the survival of the passenger is locat-
ing additional supportive care and an appropriate medical facil-
ity which, particularly on international flights, will involve
decisions by the flight crew.3 2 Further, flight crews now can
often contact medical personnel on the ground for assistance.
There is even consideration of the use of telemetry to monitor
the condition of ill passengers from the ground. 4
2 Wolbrink & Borillo, supra note 25, at 7.
30 An example is the Heartstream ForeRunner, which received FDA clearance
in September -1996 and was the AED selected by American Airlines for its aircraft.
See Tamar Nordenberg, Air Aid: Medical Kits, Reach New Heights, FDA CONSUMER,
Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 27; Heartstream, Inc., Heartstream's ForeRunner Debuts in Front of
Congress, Press Release, Jun. 3, 1997 (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://
www.heartstream.com/061397.htm>. The Heartstream ForeRunner was also
tested in accordance with FAA prescribed procedures for utilizing portable elec-
tronic devices abroad aircraft. See Section III E 3 for further discussion.
31 See, e.g., Wolbrink & Borillo, supra note 25, at 10*. American Airlines also
added enhanced medical kits with AEDs and several other carriers are doing the
same. American Airlines selected a kit supplied by Banyan International. See
American Airlines, Inc., American Airlines Selects Banyan International To Provide En-
hanced Medical Kits (visited Sep. 9, 1999) <http://www.amrcorp.com/amr/
janl398htm>. The contents of the enhanced medical kit utilized by American
Airlines is provided as Attachment "C," while Attachment "C-i" shows the con-
tents of the kit provided by MedAire to its clients. The enhanced medical kits not
only contain drugs to treat cardiac problems but also can address a variety of
illnesses that may develop on board. However, these kits are intended for medi-
cally trained personnel only.
32 See Wolbrink & Borillo, supra note 25, at 10.
33 For example, the American Airlines Corporate Medical Department pro-
vides its "Physicians on Call" program for assistance with on board medical emer-
gencies. See McKenas, supra note 20, at 366. Delta obtains its emergency medical
advice via radio from physicians with the University of Pittsburgh Center while
Northwest pilots are patched directly to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.
See John Crewdson, Airlines Upgrading In-Flight Medical Care; Carriers, Improving
Kits-But at Own Pace, CHI. TiuB., Aug. 1, 1999, at C1 [hereinafter Crewdson,
AirlineUpgrading].
The leading independent provider of medical ground support for the airlines is
MedAire, which has contracts with more than a dozen airlines, including U.S.
Airways, Continental, Alaska, Southwest, Virgin Atlantic, TWA and British Air-
ways. MedAire arranges for worldwide twenty-four hour a day radio links to phy-
sicians in the emergency department of Phoenix's Good Samaritan Regional
Medical Center. See id.
34 See McKenas, supra note 20, at 366. American Airlines' medical director, Dr.
David K. McKenas, however, believes that at present, the best "medicine" for sud-
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Another significant aspect of an in-flight medical emergency
is the availability of a physician/passenger on the aircraft.
There was a concern, however, that physicians on board flights
often would not make themselves known to the flight crew be-
cause of the risk of individual liability.
Against this background, Congress in 1997 began to review
the issue of in-flight emergencies. The Aviation Subcommittee
for the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
sought to address four different areas of concern:
1. Reevaluation of the equipment required in medical kits and
the medical training required by flight attendants.
2. The necessity for a requirement that air carriers report such
information to the FAA.
3. Whether AEDs should be required on commercial passenger
airplanes and at airports.
4. Possible limitations of the liability of the carrier and any pas-
senger rendering medical assistance.35
The fifth and final version of H.R. 2843, known as the Avia-
tion Medical Assistance Act of 1998, was discharged by the Sen-
ate Commerce Committee for consideration by the Senate in
April 1998. The Senate Commerce Committee had also consid-
ered a companion Senate bill, S. 1584, introduced by Senator
Frist (a physician from Tennessee)16 and Senator Dorgan. H.R.
2843 passed the Senate without amendment by unanimous con-
sent on April 3, 1998 and was signed into law by the President as
The Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 (AMAA or "Act")
on April 24, 1998.17
II. THE AVIATION MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1998
The following summarizes of the key provisions of the Avia-
tion Medical Assistance Act. A complete copy of the law is At-
tachment "D" to this paper.
den cardiac arrests is early defibrillation and Advanced Cardiac Life Support
(ACLS). See id.
35 See Hearing, supra note 4.
36 Senator Frist received national publicity after assisting the Capitol Physi-
cian's Emergency Response Team to revive a man after he went into full cardiac
arrest in the Senate Office Building. See Diane Duston, Dr. Frist Practices His Old
Job, Aids Cleveland Man, THE CHATrANOOGA TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at Al.
37 For the legislative status of H.R. 2843, see Library of Congress, H.R. 2843,
105th Cong. (1998) (visited Aug. 28, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd-
query/z?d105:hr02843:@@@L/-tom:/bss/dlO5query.html>.
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A. MEDICAL KIT EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING
First, the Act does not require any immediate action by air
carriers with regard to changing medical equipment or training.
Instead, Congress has established a scheme whereby the FAA
will reevaluate the airlines' medical equipment and training
over a one year period. If the Administrator determines that the
current regulations should be modified as a result of such re-
evaluation, the Administrator will issue a notice of proposed
rule making."8
B. REPORTS REGARDING DEATHS ON AIRCRAFT
Because of the lack of definitive data of the nature and extent
of medical emergencies on air carriers, the Act provides that a
one year reporting period be established in which major air car-
riers are to provide quarterly reports to the FAA regarding
deaths that occurred onboard or after removal from the aircraft
and the circumstances surrounding such deaths.3 9 The report-
ing period was to begin the ninetieth day after the effective date
of the Act.40
38 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, Sec. 2 (West 1999). This section provides that such
reevaluation be accomplished within one year after the date of the enactment of
the Act (i.e., one year after April 24, 1998). See id. However, at the time of the
preparation of this article, the author was advised by the FAA that a notice of
proposed rule making would not be issued until the FAA issues its decision re-
garding automatic external defibrillators, discussed in section C below.
39 See id. § 3. A "major air carrier," which is required under the AMAA to make
the reports, is a carrier that accounts for at least one percent of the domestic
scheduled-passenger revenues in the twelve-month period ending March 31,
1997.
40 See id. § 3(a). According to the FAA, the one year period for reporting com-
menced July 1, 1998, and the final reports were due on or before June 30, 1999.
According to Dr. Jon L. Jordan, the Federal Air Surgeon, the FAA worked with
the Air Transport Association (ATA) and the flight attendant unions to devise a
data collection form, the "In-flight Medical Incident Report." The ATA then re-
quested its thirteen member air carriers participating in the data collection to
complete and return the form following any in-flight medical emergency that
results in death or the threat of death. The ATA would then forward the forms to
the FAA for the period July 1, 1998 -June 30, 1999, on a quarterly basis.
The ATA member airlines reporting were Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, Ameri-
can Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Midwest Express Airlines,
Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines,
United Parcel Service, US Airways and associate member, Canadian Airlines In-
ternational (a copy of the "In-Flight Medical Incident Report Form" is provided
as Attachment "E").
There has also been litigation brought pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, in an attempt to obtain other in-flight medical emergency
data from the FAA. In Chicago Tribune Co. v. Federal Aviation Administration, No.
1999]
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C. DECISION ON AUTOMATIC EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATORS
One of the key objectives of Congress was to determine
whether passenger deaths could be prevented by the improved
technology in portable defibrillators; whether the benefits of in-
stalling the defibrillators would justify the costs to the airlines;
and on what types of aircraft the equipment should be re-
quired.4' As noted above, the Act sets up reporting require-
ments so that, rather than relying on anecdotal reports, the FAA
would have sufficient data from which to determine whether a
need exists.
The statute provides that, once the period for reporting
deaths on aircraft expired, the FAA had four months to decide
whether or not to require AEDs on passenger aircraft operated
by air carriers as well as at airports.42
Under the statute, the FAA has the option of either
(a) issuing a notice of proposed rule making requiring auto-
matic external defibrillators, (b) making a recommendation to
Congress for legislation requiring defibrillators, or (c) issuing a
97 C 2363, the Chicago Tribune sought to obtain from the FAA records relating
to in-flight medical emergencies in connection with a special report that the Chi-
cago Tribune was preparing No. 97C2363, 1998 WL 242611 (N.D. Ill. May 1,
1998). Although the FAA produced many documents in unredacted form, the
FAA produced other documents that were redacted to delete the identity of the
individual persons who needed medical attention and to delete information
which could identify the airline that provided the data. See id. at *1. The court
held that the redacted information did not qualify for withholding under Exemp-
tion 4 of the Freedom of Information Act as confidential commercial informa-
tion, and ordered the redacted information to be produced. See id. at *2, *3.
The court noted that the documents at issue "merely contain factual information
regarding the nature and frequency of in-flight medical emergencies and do not
contain any in-depth analysis of the airlines in dealing with these incidents." Id.
at *2.
41 Currently, the cost of an AED is in the $3,000 to $4,000 range. See Hearing,
supra note 4, at 79 (Statement of David K. McKenas, M.D., M.P.H.).
42 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, Sec. 4(a) (West 1999). According to the FAA, the deci-
sion will be made within 120 days after the completion of collection of the data,
which occurred on June 30, 1999. Accordingly, a decision was expected by No-
vember 1999. However, at the time of writing this article, the FAA has not made
its final decision regarding the requirement of AEDs.
If the FAA requires AEDs at airports, the Act specifically provides that such AEDs
will be provided by the airports and not by the carriers. See id. § 4(e).
43 Under the statute, if the Administrator does decide to proceed with a notice
of proposed rule making, the Administrator must make her final decision not
later than the 120th day following the date on which comments are due on the
notice of proposed rule making. See id. § 4(b). The current FAA Administrator is
Jane Garvey.
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notice in the Federal Register that defibrillators should not be
required.44
If the Administrator decides that AEDs should be required on
passenger aircraft, the FAA must also address (a) the size of the
aircraft to which the requirement applies,45 (b) the class of
flights (i.e., interstate, overseas, or a foreign, or combination
thereof on which the devices should be required),46 (c) the
training to be required of air services personnel,47 and (d) the
associated equipment and medication that should also be in-
cluded in the aircraft medical kit.48
Several domestic airlines have not waited for the results of the
review required by AMAA. American Airlines was the first do-
mestic airline to equip its aircraft with AEDs and enhanced med-
ical kits. By July 1997, American Airlines had placed AEDs on
242 routes over water and had trained flight attendants in their
use.4' From June 1997 until March 1998, AEDs were utilized on
forty-eight persons (74% men) experiencing cardiac symptoms
(forty-two in aircraft, six in an airport), and were successfully
employed for monitoring/therapy in forty-seven of the forty-
eight instances, with data being unavailable to evaluate the
other event.5" There were no inappropriate shocks. Fifteen
- See id.
45 See id. § 4(c) (1) (A) The FAA may not require AEDs on helicopters or on
aircraft with a maximum payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less. See id. § 4(d).
46 See id. § 4(c)(1)(B).
47 See id. § 4(c)(1)(C).
48 See id. § 4(c)(1)(D).
49 See Page, supra note 22, at 21. According to American Airlines procedures,
when the crew is alerted to an unconscious passenger, one flight attendant will
tend to the passenger while another retrieves the defibrillator. After laying the
passenger on the floor, the pads of the device are applied. The device then initi-
ates the self test and analyzes the heart's electrical impulses, and thereby deter-
mines whether the crew should proceed with CPR or whether an initial shock is
necessary. Through voice and text prompts, the flight attendant is walked
through the treatment process from diagnosis to the delivery of shock. AEDs do
not require the assistance of a physician, but the readouts provided by the
machine can be used by American Airlines' on-call physician to evaluate and de-
termine care through radio to ground contact. The AED will continue to moni-
tor the passenger until the aircraft can land and ground assistance arrives. See
Hearing, supra note 4 (Statements of Denise C. Hedges, President of the Associa-
tion of Professional Flight Attendants).
50 See Page, supra note 22, at 21.
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flights were diverted, and fifteen others were not, in part be-
cause of the information provided by the AED.51
After nine months of the AED program, American Airlines
concluded that the AED performed appropriately and ex-
panded the program to include all aircraft. American Airlines
has now equipped its entire fleet of 650 aircraft with AEDs and
enhanced medical kits. According to American Airlines, the
AEDs have been used more than a hundred times to monitor
passengers with cardiac problems and has saved the lives of six
passengers.52 In addition, other domestic carriers have installed
or are beginning to install defibrillators on some or all of the
airplanes. Delta Airlines has announced that all 584 aircraft in
its fleet would be equipped with automatic external defibril-
lators and enhanced emergency medical kits byJune 30, 1999. 51
US Airways began installing defibrillators and electrocardio-
51 Richard L. Page, M.D., et al., Initial Experience With On-Board Automatic Exter-
nal Defibrillators On A Domestic Commercial Airline, Circulation 98, No. 1998, Piii,
number 22 (1998): "Internal Medicine Grad Rounds."
These statistics were given a more human face in a recent story in the Chicago
Tribune. An American Airlines non-stop flight from Boston to Los Angeles was
one hour east of Denver when a passenger's heart began fibrillating wildly. As
the passenger's wife screamed for help, the flight attendant arrived with the
plane's defibrillator and applied it to the passenger. After four minutes of use of
the AED, the passenger's heart had resumed its normal rhythm. The plane di-
verted to Denver, the passenger was removed, and he was doing well in a local
hospital.
In addition to the AEDs, American Airlines also set about installing enhanced
medical kits on its airplanes at the same time. According to the same Chicago
Tribune article, while the passenger on the Boston to Los Angeles flight was being
saved by the AED, another passenger on an American Airlines flight over central
Nevada had collapsed while reading the newspaper. SeeJohn Crewdson, In-Flight
Lifesavers, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1998, at C1. However, this passenger was suffering
from hypotensive bradycardia (a dangerously slow heart rhythm) and the pre-
scribed treatment was a heart stimulant, atropine. Fortunately, one of the passen-
gers was a surgical resident, and the medical kit did indeed contain atropine.
After the atropine was administered, and an emergency landing was made in Los
Vegas, the passenger survived. See id.
52 See Laura Griffin, 3 Men Credit Airline For Saving Their Lives, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 24, 1999, at 36A. The article also notes that American Airlines has
created its "American Airlines Golden Heart Club," whose membership includes
persons saved by the defibrillator, as well as flight attendants and passengers who
used the device in flight.
53 See Delta Airlines, Inc., Delta Airlines Equips Entire Fleet with Defibrillators and
Expanded Emergency Medical Kits Ahead of Schedule, News Release, Jun. 2, 1999.
Delta also selected the Heartstream ForeRunner defibrillator as did American
Airlines and the enhanced medical kits supplied by Banyan.
On May 21, 1999, a Delta flight attendant who experienced a cardiac arrest on a
flight from Salt Lake City to New Orleans was the first life saved by the use of a
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gram monitors on its aircraft in early 1999. US Airways has also
announced that it will begin equipping its fleet with enhanced
medical kits by late 1999.""4 Northwest Airlines will begin instal-
lation toward the end of 1999 and will complete installation in
the year 2000.55 United Airlines also declared its intention to
install defibrillators and enhanced medical kits by the Summer
of 1998, but has not yet begun installation.56
D. LIMITATION OF LABILITY
For attorneys practicing aviation law, the most significant as-
pect of the AMAA is its provisions for limitation of liability.
While the limitations are important, it must also be recognized
that they are not broad in nature and must be examined
carefully.
1. Liability of Air Carriers Under the AMAA
The Act limits the airlines' liability where medically-trained
passengers are called upon to assist in medical emergencies.
Sec. 5(a) of the Act provides:
(a) Liability of air carriers. - - An air carrier shall not be liable for
damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising
out of the performance of the air carrier in obtaining or attempt-
ing to obtain the assistance of a passenger in an in-flight medical
emergency, or out of the acts or omissions of the passenger ren-
dering the assistance, if the passenger is not an employee or
agent of the carrier and the carrier in good faith believes that the
passenger is a medically qualified individual.5 7
Accordingly, the elements for an air carrier to enjoy immunity
are as follows:
Delta AED. See John Crewdson, Delta Saves Life of Attendant in Its First Use of
Defibrillator, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1999, at 5.
54 See US Airways, Inc, US Airways to Begin Equipping Aircraft with Enhanced Emer-
gency Medical Kits, News Release, Aug. 26, 1999 (visited Oct. 17, 1999) <http://
www.usairways.com/company/news/nw-99-0826.htm>. "US Airways selected
the Lifepak 500 defibrillator made by Medtronic Physio-Control... and the Bio-
log 3000 hand-held monitor manufactured by Micromedical ...." US Airways
also utilizes MedAire's Medlink Physicians for on ground support. See id.
55 See Northwest Airlines Corporation Reports Second Quarter Profit of $120 Million,
PR NEwswiRE, July 20, 1999, at 3.
56 Apparently, protracted negotiations in the signing of a contract to train
United's 25,000 flight attendants have caused a delay in United's timetable to
install the AEDs in its aircraft. See Crewdson, Airlines Upgrading, supra note 33, at
Cl.
57 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, Sec. 5(a) (West 1999).
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" the action must arise out of the carrier's obtaining or attempt-
ing to obtain the assistance of a passenger in an in-flight medi-
cal emergency, or out of the acts or omissions of the passenger
rendering the assistance;
* the passenger must not be an employee or agent of the air
carrier; and
" the carrier must in good faith believe the passenger is a medi-
cally qualified individual.
Thus, a carrier clearly:
* is still liable for the acts of its own agents or employees.
" is protected from liability for the acts or omissions of the pas-
senger rendering assistance only if the carrier in good faith
believes the passenger is medically qualified.5"
Suppose that the carrier's employees rely upon the represen-
tations of a medically qualified passenger to determine that a
diversion to an alternate airport is not necessary. Does this re-
lieve the air carrier of liability under the statute? As will be dis-
cussed more fully below, the answer, apparently, is no.
2. Liability of Individuals Under the AMAA
As was noted in the hearings before the Aviation Subcommit-
tee, evidence suggested that many physicians and other quali-
fied medical personnel who may be on board a flight when a
medical emergency arises may not respond to an emergency be-
cause of concerns about personal liability.59 Congress addressed
the question of the liability for the potential Good Samaritan as
follows:
(b) Liability of individuals. - - An individual shall not be liable
for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court
arising out of the acts or omissions of the individual in providing
or attempting to provide assistance in the case of an in-flight
medical emergency unless the individual, while rendering such
assistance, is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 6°
Accordingly, the medically qualified passenger, called upon to
assist in an in-flight emergency, should not today be concerned
about his personal liability. However, the question remains as to
58 "A 'medically qualified individual' includes any person who is licensed, certi-
fied, or otherwise qualified to provide medical care in a State, including a physi-
cian, nurse, physician assistant, paramedic, or emergency medical technician."
Id. § 6(3).
59 It is estimated that a physician is present on board 85% of American Air-
lines's flights. See Page, supra note 23, at 21.
60 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, Sec. 5(b) (West 1999).
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how to bring such good news to the attention of such passen-
gers. Because the Act is so new, it is probably not common
knowledge among physicians that such a Good Samaritan stat-
ute now exists. 61
E. APPLICATION TO U.S. CARRIERS
The limitation of liability as set forth in section 5(a) of the
AMAA applies to an "air carrier. '"62 The term "air carrier" has
the same meaning as in 49 U.S.C. § 40102, i.e., "a citizen of the
United States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly,
to provide air transportation."63 On the other hand, the liability
limitation does not apply to a "foreign air carrier" which is "a
person not a citizen of the United States, undertaking by any
means, directly or indirectly, to provide foreign air transporta-
tion."' The limitation does apply, however, to international
transportation conducted by a domestic air carrier.
III. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIER FOR IN-FLIGHT
MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
A. INTRODUCTION
In-flight medical emergencies have often resulted in litigation
against the airlines on which the emergency occurred. There
are many reported cases involving in-flight medical emergencies
on both domestic and international flights prior to the April 24,
1998, effective date of the AMAA. This paper will examine the
circumstances under which the airline can be liable and, in par-
ticular, the extent to which the AMAA has affected such liability.
61 One additional issue which has arisen is whether the "Good Samaritan" is
entitled to be compensated. A British psychiatrist sued American Airlines in
London for the compensation of his treatment of a passenger that experience an
in-flight medical emergency. The doctor billed American Airlines for about $900
for his time and said that the airline's gift of about $250 in travel vouchers and a
bottle of champagne was inadequate. The case received much publicity in Eng-
land and the United States. See Yvonne Barlow, Doctor Who Aided Passenger Awaits
Suit's Outcome, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 1998, at 31A.
62 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, Sec. 5(a) (West 1999).
63 See U.S.C. § 40102(a) (2).
-A Id. at § 40 102(a) (21).
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B. LIABILITY OF AIRLINES FOR IN-FLIGHT MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
ON INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS
1. Was there an "accident" under Article 17?
If a passenger is injured on an international flight, the first
question that arises is whether the Warsaw Convention applies.65
Ordinarily, the Warsaw Convention is applicable to cases of bod-
ily injury which occurred during "international transporta-
tion."66 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides that air
carriers are liable for injuries to passengers on international
flights "if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking."67 Thus, an airline is
liable to a passenger under the Convention if the passenger
proves that an "accident" caused his injury.68
The United States Supreme Court has defined "accident" to
mean "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is ex-
ternal to the passenger. "69 For example, in Air France v. Saks, a
passenger on a twelve-hour flight from Paris to Los Angeles be-
gan to feel severe pain and pressure in her left ear as the plane
descended into Los Angeles. Five days later, she visited a doc-
tor, who concluded that she was permanently deaf in her left
ear. A federal district court in California granted summaryjudg-
65 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014
137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
66 In pertinent part, Article 1(2) states: ... 'international transportation' shall
mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination ... are situated either within
the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single
High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory...
of another power. .. ." Id.
67 Article 17 states: "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking." Id. at 3018.
68 A carrier may use the Warsaw Convention defensively to either take advan-
tage of its monetary limitations or to argue that it provides an exclusive remedy
but there is no recoverable "accident" under the Convention. Significantly, the
recent changes brought about by the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, which has
been signed by most carriers, provides for carrier liability regardless of fault up to
approximately $140,000 U.S. (100 Special Drawing Rights) and the possibility of
a recovery above $140,000 U.S. without any monetary limitation.
69 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
ER IN THE SKIES
ment in favor of the airline on the basis that the passenger's
injury did not constitute "an accident" under the Warsaw Con-
vention, but a divided Court of Appeals reversed. Granting certi-
orari, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the district
court and held that the plaintiff's injury did not constitute an
accident under the Convention. The United States Supreme
Court held that "when the injury undisputably results from the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and ex-
pected operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an
accident, and Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention cannot ap-
ply."' 70 Thus, in-flight medical emergencies that are caused
either by a normal occurrence during the flight or by a passen-
gers internal condition do not constitute accidents under the
Warsaw Convention.71
In Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,72 the plaintiff s decedent
suffered a heart attack while a passenger on an international
flight and plaintiff alleged that the flight crew failed to provide
proper assistance. The court held that the plaintiff had alleged
an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17, not because of
the heart attack itself, but because of the alleged aggravation of
the decedent's condition by the negligent failure of the defend-
ant's employees to render medical assistance.73
Perhaps the most interesting and significant case involving an
in-flight emergency in international travel is Krys v. Lufthansa
German Airlines.7 4 There, plaintiff Krys, a forty-seven year old
70 See id. at 406.
71 The following cases illustrate findings of no accident: Krys v. Lufthansa Ger-
man Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1522 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1042
(1998) (airline failed to make an unscheduled landing after a passenger suffered
a heart attack on an international flight); Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739
F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1984) (airline failed to help passenger suffering from her-
nia attack); DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (3d
Cir. 1978) (pain in the passenger's head and a loss of equilibrium); Tandon v.
United Air Lines, 926 F. Supp. 366, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (sudden heart attack);
Walker v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (parties
agreed passenger suffered asthma attack); Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 623
F. Supp. 1064, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (failure to treat passenger who suffered a
heart attack and subsequently died onboard a flight); Warshaw v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (passenger suffered a loss
of hearing due to normal cabin depressurization).
72 86 A.D.2d 658, 446 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), affid, 57 N.Y.2d 767,
454 N.Y.S.2d 991, 440 N.E.2d 1339 (N.Y. 1982).
73 See id. at 398. The result of finding that there was an "accident" within the
meaning of the Warsaw Convention resulted in plaintiff's claim being barred by
the Convention's two year limitation period. See id. at 399.
74 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997).
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travel agent, was a passenger on a Lufthansa flight from Miami
to Frankfurt, Germany. In the early hours of the flight, Krys
began to feel ill and contacted a flight attendant who requested
that any doctors onboard the plane identify themselves to the
crew. Three passengers responded. After the passengers
agreed that Dr. Fischmann was best suited to handle the situa-
tion, he began to attend to Mr. Krys. Dr. Fischmann concluded
from his initial examination of the patient that "there was noth-
ing to worry about"; only when the flight was over Amsterdam
did Dr. Fischmann become convinced that Krys might be having
a heart attack. 5
The magistrate judge found, however, that Krys had "suffered
the symptoms of a cardiac infarction, as described by the Ameri-
can Medical Association and Lufthansa's Manual,... within the
first one and one-half to three hours of the ten hour
flight ....- 7 6 During that time period, the plane's flight path
kept it close to the U.S. east coast, but the crew-ostensibly rely-
ing on Dr. Fischmann's opinion-did not make an unscheduled
landing.77 After landing in Germany, the plane was met by an
ambulance that transported Krys to a hospital where the doctors
concluded that he indeed had suffered a heart attack.
Filing suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, Krys did not allege that any act or omission of
Lufthansa caused the heart attack, but instead that the crew "ac-
ted negligently in responding to the symptoms displayed by Mr.
Krys and thus aggravated the damage to his heart."78 The de-
fendants, moving for summary judgment, "argued that the
plaintiffs' state law causes of action were preempted either by
the Warsaw Convention or, alternatively, by the Federal Aviation
Act. '79 After these arguments were rejected, the case proceeded
to trial as a common-law negligence action. The trial judge
ruled in favor of plaintiff and rendered judgment in the amount
of $1.8 million for Mr. Krys and $600,000 for his wife. °
Affirming, the Eleventh Circuit first rejected Lufthansa's argu-
ment that the events that occurred on the flight constituted an
"accident" under the terms of the Warsaw Convention, thus pre-
cluding any state law claims. While acknowledging that the
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question was close, the court held that looking solely to a factual
description of the aggravating event, i.e., the continuation of
the flight to its scheduled point of arrival, "compels a conclusion
that the aggravation injury was not caused by an 'unusual or un-
expected event or happening that is external to the plaintiff,"'81
and accordingly, there was no accident within the meaning of
the Warsaw Convention.
The Eleventh Circuit went on to hold that the district court's
findings of fact, that Mr. Krys was displaying symptoms of a heart
attack within the one to three hours of the flight and that the
airline crew was negligent in failing to land even though the
doctor on board had informed the crew that, in his opinion, Mr.
Krys was not having a heart attack, were not clearly erroneous.
Under Florida law, a common carrier owes the highest degree of
care to its passengers . 2 While the Eleventh Circuit again agreed
that the question was close, the court took note of both the
plaintiff's expert testimony that the Lufthansa crew deviated
from airline industry standards by relying upon the opinion of
the doctor rather than using their own judgment and following
their own manuals, and his further testimony that the captain of
the aircraft "must bear the ultimate responsibility as the person
in charge. '8 3 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit felt that "the
magistrate judge could conclude that notwithstanding Dr.
Fischmann's impressions, Lufthansa's employees knew or
should have known that Mr. Krys was suffering a heart attack,
and thus that an unscheduled landing was necessary. '"84
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the evidence supported a
finding that the crew's negligence led to significant permanent
injury to the passenger's heart and affirmed the damage award.
Since it was uncontested that the airline did not cause the heart
attack, plaintiff had to prove he sustained damages as a direct
result of a failure to land the aircraft at an available airport. Ap-
parently, Mr. Krys' cardiologist testified at trial that if Mr. Krys
had received thrombolytic therapy two to four hours after the
onset of the symptoms, the damage to his heart would have
been significantly less.8"
If the Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 had been in
effect at the time of Mr. Krys' heart attack, would there have
81 Krys, 119 F.3d at 1522.
82 See id. at 1527.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1528.
85 See id. at 1529.
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been a different result in this case? The answer apparently is
no. 6 The Act makes it clear that the airline is not liable for
"obtaining or attempting to obtain" the assistance of a passen-
ger, nor is the airline responsible for damages arising "out of the
acts or omissions of the passenger rendering the assistance" (if
the airline believes in good faith that the passenger is medically
qualified). However, the Act apparently does not relieve the
carrier of its own duty of care to the passenger, and the crew
retains its responsibility for the passenger's safety.87 Accord-
ingly, when deciding not to land the aircraft as soon as possible,
or deciding not to seek additional medical assistance, a crew
cannot solely rely upon the opinion of a "medically qualified"
assistance. Thus, if a jury finds the crew's decision negligent,
the carrier will be held liable.
In the report from the Committee on Transportation and In-
frastructure that accompanied H.R. 2843, it was stated:
[this] provision should not affect situations such as the one
that arose in Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines. The provision in
the reported bill ensures that airlines will not be held liable for
the acts or omissions of passengers who are not its employees
and whom they do not control. However, in Krys, the airline was
held liable there not because of acts or omissions of the passen-
ger rendering assistance but rather because the airline's employ-
ees failed to divert the flight and land when its own policy as well
as standard industry practice indicated that it should have done
SO.
8 8
From the airline's standpoint, it is difficult to comprehend
why the flight and cabin crew, as in Krys, would be in a better
position than a trained physician to evaluate whether or not a
passenger is having a heart attack. It appears, however, from the
report accompanying H.R. 2843 that it was the intent of the
AMAA that, regardless of the physician's advice, the airline's em-
ployees must continue to follow the airline's own policy as well
as whatever "standard industry practice" may apply.
As noted below, however, the recent U.S. Supreme Court de-
cision in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng has, in effect, overruled
that part of the Krys opinion, which permitted the plaintiff to
proceed with his state law claim.
86 Further, it would appear that the AMAA would not apply in this case since it
only applies to U.S. owned carriers.
87 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, Sec. 5(a) (West 1999).
88 H. R. REP. No. 105-456 (1998).
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2. Is the Warsaw Convention exclusive or may the passenger pursue
state law remedies?
Another significant issue involving international flights and
the AMAA is whether the Warsaw Convention provides the ex-
clusive remedy so as to preempt state law, even where there is no
finding of accident under Article 17. While plaintiffs have ar-
gued that Article 17 is exclusive only when the injury was caused
by an "accident" as defined in that same Article 17, airlines have
contended that the Warsaw Convention preempts state law
causes of action, leaving the passenger with no remedy, either
under the Warsaw Convention or under state law for claims not
arising from accidents. Until recently, there was a split among
the circuits regarding exclusivity; the Second Circuit and the
Third Circuit held that the Warsaw Convention does not pro-
vide the exclusive remedy,89 while the Fifth Circuit held the op-
posite.90 This dispute has been resolved in favor of the airlines,
both by amendment to the Warsaw Convention and by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
On September 28, 1998, the United States subscribed to Mon-
treal Protocol No. 4, which amends Article 24 of the Warsaw
Convention. Article 24, as amended, now reads as follows:
In the carriage of passengers. . ., any action for damages...
can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out
in this Convention .... 91
Thus, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in El Al Israel Air-
lines, Ltd. v. Tseng, under this Protocol, "[an international] pas-
senger whose injury is not compensable under the Convention
(because it entails no 'bodily injury' or was not the result of an
'accident') will have no recourse to an alternate remedy. '9 2
In Tseng, the Supreme Court held that, even prior to signing
the Montreal Protocol, the Warsaw Convention precluded a pas-
senger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages
under local law even when the passenger's claim does not satisfy
the conditions for liability under the Warsaw Convention.93 The
- Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
118 S.Ct. 1793 (1998), and Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 1059 (1985).
90 Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996), and Boehringer-
Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
91 119 U.S. 662, 667 (1999).
92 Id. at 667-68.
93 See id. at 668.
1999]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Supreme Court held that if the plaintiff did not suffer bodily
injuries suffered as a result of an "accident ...on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking," then not only has the plaintiff failed to state a
claim that is compensable under the Warsaw Convention, but,
under Article 24 of the Convention, the plaintiff has no remedy
under state law.94
Presently, for an international passenger to prevail on a claim
for medical emergency on an international flight subject to the
Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff must proceed under the Con-
vention and, therefore, must establish that his injury was caused
by "an accident" within the meaning of Article 17. However, as
discussed earlier, the courts frequently have found that a passen-
ger's medical emergency was the result of routine travel proce-
dures and a passenger's own internal reaction, and not the
result of an "accident" within the meaning of Article 1 7.5 In a
"non-accident" case, the passenger now has no remedy.
As the foregoing cases indicate, the plaintiff may want the
Warsaw Convention to apply in order to take advantage of its
absolute liability provision, while the defendant may invoke the
Convention for its damages limitation or claim preclusion.
Therefore, although beyond the scope of this paper, it should
be noted that with the recent waiver of liability limitations pur-
suant to the IATA Agreement by many airlines, the application
of the Convention will certainly be more attractive to a passen-
ger seeking recovery for an in-flight medical emergency against
such airlines, if he can prove that his damages were caused by an
"accident. '
""
C. LIABILITY ON DOMESTIC FLIGHTS
In the Krys case, the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the Warsaw
Convention did not apply, affirmed a judgment for the passen-
ger on the basis of Florida state law. 7 Although it is now clear
94 Id.
95 See cases cited in Section III. B. 1.
96 See supra text accompanying note 66. Further, it would be noted that a new
international aviation liability agreement created to replace the 1929 Warsaw
Convention and its many protocols and amendments was opened for signature
on May 28, 1999. The new Convention introduced a two-tier liability system pro-
viding strict liability for airline passenger death or injury up to $100,000 Special
Drawing Rights, currently about $135,000. The second tier provides unlimited
liability when a carrier is presumed to be at fault, Av. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1166,
Jun. 16, 1999.
97 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1527 (11th Cir. 1997).
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after Tseng that state law would not have been available to the
plaintiff in Krys, that case remains instructive in cases in which
state law is applicable. As the Krys court noted, Florida imposes
the highest degree of care on airlines toward its passengers.9"
Many states, including Texas, likewise have an enhanced stan-
dard of care for a common carrier such as an airline.99
As the above discussion of the Krys case indicated, the airline
could not discharge its state law duty to the passenger by defer-
ring to the medical opinion of Dr. Fischmann, the doctor on
board the aircraft. This apparently continues to be the case
even after the passage of the Aviation Medical Assistance Act.
It is clear that the plaintiff cannot recover based upon negli-
gent treatment provided by a medically qualified passenger.
Thus, as in Krys, the plaintiffs probably will contend that the
crew either failed to respond to the passenger when notified of a
medical problem, or that the crew failed to divert the aircraft
and/or seek additional medical assistance when it appeared that
such action was necessary, regardless of the advice given to the
crew by a medically qualified person on board the aircraft. In
these cases, an examination of the airlines' manuals for the
flight crew and cabin crew will be appropriate in order to ascer-
tain the guidelines provided by the carrier.
D. PLAINTIFF'S THEORIES OF LIABILITY
1. Failure to Render Assistance
Perhaps the most common cause of action alleged against an
air carrier involving in-flight emergencies is a failure by the crew
to render assistance. As noted above, the majority of the courts
that have considered these issues in a Warsaw context have con-
cluded there was not an accident under Article 17.l°0 On the
other hand, in Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, the New York courts
found the crew's negligent failure to render medical assistance
aggravated the decedent's condition thereby creating an "acci-
98 Id.
- Dallas Railway & Terminal v. Travis, 78 S.W.2d 941,942 (Tex. 1935). Accord-
ing to Kriendler, Aviation Accident Law Revised, the majority of the states con-
tinue to hold a common carrier airline to "the highest degree of care." See LEE S.
KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACcIDENT LAW REviSED § 2.07, 27-30 (1999). On the other
hand, Kriendler notes that care should be taken in reviewing the latest decisions
in each state since some states, such as New York, have recently moved away from
a high degree of care standard. See id.
-o See Section III. B. 1. herein.
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dent."1 °1 As also noted above, a case may not proceed on the
state law claims if an accident is not found under Article 17.
The following cases have addressed state law claims in the
context of a carrier's failure to render aid:
" Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines.1°2 This significant decision
has already been discussed in detail above.
* Northern Trust Company v. American Airlines Inc.:1"5 The plain-
tiff's decedent died from heart disease after being taken to a
hospital in Mexico City during a stop over on his flight from
Acapulco to Chicago. The plaintiff alleged that American Air-
lines was negligent in failing to remove the plaintiffs decedent
from the aircraft when it became apparent that the stop over
would be longer than anticipated and in failing to immediately
transport the plaintiffs decedent to a Mexico City hospital
when it became apparent that the condition required medical
treatment that would only be rendered in the hospital.
Although the jury found the plaintiff 60% contributorily negli-
gent and reduced his damages accordingly, the case was re-
versed because of the exclusion of testimony regarding the
plaintiffs own negligence in failing to use due care for his own
safety in even taking the flight. 10 4
* Walker v. Eastern Air Lines Inc.:105 In this case, the plaintiffs
husband died from an asthmatic condition during a flight
from Jamaica to New York. Plaintiff contended that Eastern
was negligent in allowing her husband to board the plane and
by not providing him with adequate care after boarding. After
concluding that there was not an accident under the Warsaw
Convention, the court ruled that there was an issue of material
fact as to whether the airline's negligence aggravated the pas-
senger's pre-existing asthmatic condition, thereby contributing
to his death.'0 6
2. Failure to Divert and/or Land as Soon as Possible
Another possible theory of recovery for the plaintiff is negli-
gence of the airline in failing to divert or make an unscheduled
landing. This certainly was the basis for recovery in the Krys
case.'0 7 On the other hand, in Hollis v. American Airlines Inc.," 8
101 86 A.D. 2d 658.
102 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1042 (1998).
103 491 N.E.2d 417 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1985).
104 See id. at 422.
105 775 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Penn. 1977).
106 See Walker, 775 F. Supp. at 116. This case should also be reviewed in light of
the recent Tseng decision, addressed herein in Section III. B. 2.
107 119 F.3d at 1522.
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the Fifth Circuit dismissed as frivolous an appeal by the plaintiffs
from a summary judgment in a case involving a passenger who
suffered a heart attack while the flight was en route to Jackson,
Mississippi. When the flight attendants notified the captain of
the situation, he received clearance for a "straight in approach"
at the Jackson International Airport.10 9 Although emergency
medical personnel boarded the airplane immediately and at-
tended to the passenger while the remaining twenty or so pas-
sengers (all seated in front of the decedent) disembarked in the
front, the passenger died some four days later at a local Jackson
hospital. The plaintiffs' basis for liability was that American Air-
lines was negligent for (1) failing to "request priority landing
clearance at Jackson," (2) allowing the other passengers to dis-
embark before the deceased, and (3) not allowing the ambu-
lance to park near the aircraft at the Jackson Airport.110 In
finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact re-
garding acts or omissions by American Airlines, the Fifth Circuit
held:
It is obvious beyond question that the various decisions and judg-
ment calls made on that fateful night, that Appellants accuse
American Airlines of having made negligently, were simply not
made by American Airlines; neither were they American's to
make. Appellants' position on appeal-arguing that American
Airlines has liability for such decisions-is so lacking in legal
merit as to be frivolous as a matter of law.1 '
Accordingly, while the plaintiffs may allege that the carrier
was negligent in failing to divert or land the aircraft as quickly as
possible upon being made aware of the medical emergency, the
plaintiff must take care to allege negligent acts or omissions that
are actually within the control of the carrier.
A diversion for a medical emergency can often present diffi-
cult choices for the crew. A diversion is not only expensive for
the airline, but also disrupts other passengers' schedules. Fur-
ther, a diversion to an unintended or unknown airport may raise
other concerns. If the airline does not fly into that particular
airport on a regular basis, the aircraft may not have ground sup-
port available and the crew may not be aware of the proximity or
108 138 F.3d 1028 (5th Cir. 1998).
-o See id. at 1029. The Fifth Circuit Opinion does not indicate when during
the flight the passenger became ill or whether there were closer alternative air-
ports available for a diversion.
110 Id. at 1030.
111 Id.
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quality of available medical care. Accordingly, it may be in the
passenger's best interest for a flight to proceed to its intended
destination, perhaps after requesting and receiving expedited
handling from air traffic control, rather than to land at an alter-
nate airport where there may be additional delays in obtaining
appropriate medical care for the ill passenger.
3. Failure to Provide Medical Equipment or Supplies
In Tandon v. United Air Lines,'12 the passenger died after suf-
fering a heart attack while on board a flight from London to
New York. Her son-in-law, a doctor, was administering oxygen
to the ill passenger. However, the oxygen container was empty,
and he requested additional oxygen but was told there was none
available. While the plane was still en route, the passenger lost
consciousness and died. After holding that there was no "acci-
dent" under the Warsaw Convention, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs state law claims were not preempted by the War-
saw Convention and could proceed."'
In Somes v. United Airlines, Inc.,114 the plaintiffs decedent suf-
fered a cardiac arrest while a passenger on a flight from Boston
to San Francisco." 5 Plaintiffs sole theory of liability is the fail-
ure of the carrier to have an AED or other proper medical
equipment onboard. 1" 6 In this case, which is still pending,
United sought dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint based upon
express and implied preemption. 7 At present, the FARs only
call for a first aid kit and a medical kit whose required contents
are set forth in FAR 121.309. As noted above, the FAA is cur-
rently examining the issue as to whether AEDs should be re-
quired on air carriers. In the meantime, AEDs have been
utilized on some international carriers since 1990, and on do-
mestic carriers since 1997.
Accordingly, can a plaintiff still pursue a state law claim that
the airline is negligent in not equipping the aircraft with auto-
112 926 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
13 See Tandon, 926 F. Supp. at 370-371. This decision would also be overruled
by the recent decision in Tseng, supra Section III. B. 2.
114 33 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
"15 See United Says Sit on Lack of Defibrillator Preempted by Fed. Law, (Memo-
randum in Support of Defendant, United Airlines, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss), AVI-
ATION LITIG. REPORTER 25344, May 12, 1998. As discussed in Section III. E. 1.,
United Airlines, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss was denied.
116 See Somes, 33 F. Supp. at 80.
117 See id. at 80.
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matic external defibrillators? In addition to the preemption ar-
gument raised by Somes,"'1 there is also the question whether the
express limitation of liability contained in the AMAA applies. It
appears not because the protection provided for the air carrier
is limited to those situations "arising out of the performance of
the air carrier in obtaining or attempting to obtain the assist-
ance of a passenger" in an in-flight medical emergency.11 9
Further, what if the aircraft is equipped with an automatic ex-
ternal defibrillator and it fails to function? Depending upon the
reason for the malfunction, e.g., whether the AED unit was im-
properly maintained, or whether the AED itself was defective, a
cause of action may lie against the airline and/or the manufac-
turer of the AED. 12 ° Research has revealed no instances of AED
failure on aircraft to date, but, as noted above, these units have
only recently become commonly used in airline service. It is as-
sumed that in deciding whether or not to require AEDs on pas-
senger aircraft, the FAA, pursuant to its obligations under the
AMAA, will consider whether or not AEDs are sufficiently relia-
ble and practical to require their use on all passenger aircraft.
4. Negligence of crew in providing medical care
It is clear from the AMAA that the air carrier will still be liable
for the acts or omissions of its employees in rendering assist-
ance.12 Accordingly, it appears that an allegation could be
made either that the airline failed to properly train its personnel
in how to respond to medical emergencies or, alternatively, that
a crew member failed to follow the prescribed procedures.1 22
Further, with the introduction of sophisticated equipment
such as the AEDs, there may be a concern that damage may be
done to a passenger by an improperly administered shock.
However, the unit is designed to operate completely automati-
cally and, to date, there have been no instances of a shock being
improperly applied to a passenger.1 23
118 Id.
119 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, § 5(a) (West 1999).
120 At least one manufacturer, HP Heartstream, has established a program to
indemnify owners of ForeRunner AEDs who experience mechanical or electrical
failure or malfunction that did not result from negligence, gross negligence, or
improper acts. See Hewlett-Packard, Co., HP Introduces AED User Indemnification
Program, News Release, July 8, 1998.
121 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, Sec. 4(a) (West 1999)
122 As discussed supra note 14, the degree of crew training varies greatly among
the airlines.
123 See Page, supra note 22, at 22-23.
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E. DEFENSES
1. Preemption
In 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA),
which substantially deregulated domestic air transportation.
Section 1305 (a) (1) of the ADA provides that: "No state ... shall
enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates,
routes, or services of any carrier .... -124 Two Supreme Court
decisions have discussed the scope of preemption under the
ADA. In Morales v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 25 the Supreme
Court ruled that the ADA preempted state enforcement of the
Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines adopted by the Na-
tional Association of State Attorneys General. And in American
Airlines Inc. v. Wolens,1 26 the Supreme Court held that the ADA
preempted the plaintiffs consumer fraud claims with regard to
the American Airlines Frequent Flyer Program but not plain-
tiff's breach of contract action.
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue,
many other courts have held that the ADA does not displace
state law actions for physical injuries or property damage, partic-
ularly when related to the operation and maintenance of the
aircraft. 127 Until recently, the Ninth Circuit made a distinction
between actions relating to "services," which the court found
were preempted by the ADA, and actions relating to "operations
124 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (1999).
125 504 U.S. 374, 391 (1992).
126 513 U.S. 219, 220 (1995).
127 See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that a
passenger injured by object falling from overhead bin); Continental Airlines, Inc.
v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996) (in consolidated appeal of claims involving
Continental and American Airlines, Texas Supreme Court held that ADA did not
preempt common law negligence claims against air carriers and did not preempt
all negligence claims arising out of "meet and assist" services); Barbakow v. US
Air, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Fl. 1996) (stating that a passenger injured when
flight attendant dropped a soft drink on her foot); Haavistola v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 96C-06-047-JOH 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 63 (Del. Super. Ct. February 28,
1997) (stating that a passenger injured by unruly passenger kicking her); Knopp
v. American Airlines Inc., 938 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1996) (plaintiff could proceed
on both negligence and contract claims for failure to provide wheelchair and
resulting from injuries sustained when she fell from electric cart that carrier pro-
vided); Peterson v. Continental Airlines Inc., 970 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating police escorting plaintiff off airplane after plaintiff refused to deboard
on overbooked flight); Rivera v. Delta Air Lines Inc., No. 96-CV-1130, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14989 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1997) (finding plaintiff, who had requested
wheelchair, suffered injuries when she fell in airline terminal).
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and maintenance" of an aircraft, which the court found were
not preempted. 128 However, in Charas v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 29 the Ninth Circuit overruled Gee and other authorities
which had made such a distinction. Instead, the court held that
the term "services" means economic services and does not in-
clude such personal services as an airline's provision of in-flight
beverages, assistance to passengers, handling of luggage, and
similar amenities. 130
Somes is the only reported preemption case specifically involv-
ing an in-flight medical emergency. 31 As previously noted,
plaintiff's theory of liability was the failure of the carrier to have
an AED or other proper medical equipment on board. 32 The
defendant, United Airlines, filed a motion to dismiss, contend-
ing that there was express preemption pursuant to the ADA or,
alternatively, implied preemption on the basis of the pervasive-
ness of federal regulation of aviation safety. On January 11,
1999, the U.S. District Court in Boston denied the motion.1 33
After a comprehensive review of preemption decisions, includ-
ing the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Charas v. TransWorld
Airlines, Inc., TM the district court found that the provision of
emergency medical equipment to treat in-flight medical emer-
gencies was unrelated to the actual operation of the aircraft and
therefore, was distinct from the "services" Congress had in mind
when it adopted the ADA's preemption provision. 1 5 The court
also noted that the provision of emergency medical equipment
was not inherent in airlines operations and was typically not a
"bargained for or anticipated" service and accordingly would
not be preempted under the Fifth Circuit's definition in Hodges
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,' 3 6 The court went on to hold as follows:
In sum, because a requirement that airlines equip flights with
enhanced emergency medical kits is distinct from the "services"
Congress had in mind when it adopted the ADA's preemption
128 See Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997).
129 160 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1998).
-s See id. at 1266.
13' 33 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
132 The plaintiff also alleged that the carrier failed to respond to passengers "in
the throes of acute illness." (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss, p. 1)
133 See Somes, 33 F. Supp. at 79.
134 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
135 See Somes, 33 F. Supp. at 82.
136 See id. at 85; cf Hodges v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.
1995).
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provision, and does not have a "forbidden significant effect" on
airline "rates, routes, or services," it is not expressly
preempted. 137
The court also held that there was no implied preemption. 13
First, the court noted that the FAA regulations address "safety"
only as it relates to actual transportation of passengers to and
from their destinations, not the health and medical needs of the
individual passengers, and therefore do not suggest a congres-
sional intent to preempt the Somes' claim." 9 While the FAA reg-
ulations do contain requirements for emergency kits, the court
noted that these are only minimum requirements. 4 0 Accord-
ingly, a "requirement that airlines carry a defibrillator does not
implicate 'air safety' as understood and focused on by Congress
in its enactment of the Federal Aviation Act, and therefore is not
preempted.' 41
The court also noted that in addition to not being barred
under "field" preemption, plaintiffs claim also was not barred
under a "conflict" theory. 142 United argued that an airline
could find itself in a position of complying with a state common
law duty that conflicts with a federal requirement.1 43 In re-
jecting the argument, the district court noted that there was
nothing of record to suggest that a common law duty requiring
airlines to carry defibrillators is "in tension" with Congress's
safety concerns.
144
2. Meeting Requirements of FARs
Airlines fly under the authority of, and pursuant to, the re-
quirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), an ex-
haustive body of rules formerly known as the Civil Air
Regulations.145 Although the FAA is required by the AMAA to
reevaluate the types of medical equipment that the carriers must
carry on board and the type of training that must be provided to
the crew members, there currently are regulations in effect that
set forth the requirements of a first aid kit, a medical kit, and






143 See Somes v. United Airlines, 33 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
144 Id. at 87-88.
145 See Kriendler, supra note 94, § 2.10(1).
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the training of the airline personnel. 146 By their language, how-
ever, the regulations only prescribe the "minimum" contents for
the first aid kit and the medical kit, and only broadly describe
the training of the crew.147
The FARs are admissible into evidence to show the proper
standard of care and to demonstrate the violation of such regu-
lations may be negligence per se. 14 While it would appear that a
failure of an airline to comply with the current regulations re-
garding the contents of a medical kit, a first aid kit, or the train-
ing of the crew members ordinarily would support a negligence
146 See supra Section I.
147 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.417, 121.309(d), app. A (West 1999). Prior to 1986, the
first aid kit was the only kit required to be carried on an aircraft. In 1981, a
petition was published in the Federal Register regarding the carriage of emer-
gency medical equipment on commercial flights. See 46 Fed. Reg 42278 (1981).
In response to the petition, the FAA received comments from 370 interested per-
sons. The majority expressed their support for including an emergency medical
kit on commercial aircraft, see 51 Fed. Reg. 1218 (1986). In 1985, the FAA pub-
lished its Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) number 85-9, entitled "Emer-
gency Medical Equipment" in the Federal Register, see 50 Fed. Reg. 10444 (1988).
The FAA received approximately 140 comments in response to the NPRM. While
some commenters recommended carrying additional equipment such as cardiac
monitors/defibrillators, the majority expressed concern about the misuse of the
equipment and drugs in the proposed kit. There were also comments regarding
the necessity of Good Samaritan legislation to protect crew members and physi-
cians who might provide in-flight medical assistance. Interestingly, the American
Medical Association expressed opposition to the requirement of a medical kit to
contain surgical instruments and drugs because of its belief that the potential for
misuse outweighed any benefits that may be gained through the availability of
such equipment, see 51 Fed. Reg. 1218 (1986). In addition, the Senate Commis-
sion on Commerce, Science and Transportation, in Senate Report 99-93 dated
June 27, 1985, also in 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, stated "it is clear that these kits should
not contain surgical instruments, such as scalpels or other incisive devices, or
controlled substances as defined in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.). These items, even in the most
sophisticated of hospital emergency facilities, must be handled with extreme cau-
tion and only in conjunction with the elaborate diagnostic equipment and exper-
tise available at such facilities. They are not suitable for carriage in an on-board
medical kit." Emergency Medical Equipment, 51 Fed. Reg. 1218,1220 (1986)
(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 11). Accordingly, the FAA modified the required con-
tents of their proposed medical kit to eliminate all surgical instruments and con-
trolled drugs. The FAA noted that "this resolves or reduces many of the concerns
regarding security, the potential for liability for use of the kit, the burden of
required DEA record keeping and accountability, congressional concerns, and
the objections of numerous commenters, as discussed previously." Id. at 1221. In
essence, the FAA in 1986 deleted from the proposed medical kit many of the
same instruments and medications that are now being promoted as necessary
equipment in the new "enhanced" emergency medical kits.
148 See Kriendler, supra note 93.
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finding, the more difficult question is whether an airline can be
found negligent for not equipping its aircraft with additional
items such, as the AEDs or enhanced medical kits, which are
already in use by some airlines but are not required by the
FAA.149 This appears to go back into the issue of implied pre-
emption discussed in paragraph 1 above. For example, in Cleve-
land v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,150 Piper, in a product liability action,
"argued that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958... and the regula-
tions it ha[d] spawned impliedly preempt[ed] the state tort ac-
tions by occupying the field of airplane safety."1 51 In that
regard, Piper sought to show that its aircraft design was ap-
proved by the FAA, and it would be impossible to comply with
both state common law standards and the federal regulations.1
52
The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected Piper's argument, holding
that the Federal Aviation Act does not impliedly preempt state
law tort claims.' 53 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 1
54
On the other hand, the Third Circuit, recently held that fed-
eral law does preempt the standards of aviation safety.15 5 In this
case, passengers allegedly injured by turbulence aboard an
American Airlines flight obtained a jury verdict, but the district
court granted a new trial, holding that the Federal Aviation Act
does impliedly preempt state and territory regulations of avia-
tion safety and standards of care for pilots, flight attendants, and
passengers. Additionally, and accordingly, the district court had
erred in admitting evidence of standards other than federal
standards.'56 On appeal (the district court having certified the
issue for interlocutory review), the Third Circuit held that the
Federal Aviation Act impliedly preempts the entire field of avia-
tion safety.1 57 The Third Circuit based its holding upon the de-
termination that "the FAA and relevant federal regulations
establish complete and thorough safety standards for interstate
149 This issue may become moot once the FAA makes its recommendations
regarding AEDs and enhanced medical kits. See Aviation Medical Assistance Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-170, 112 Stat. 47 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701
(1999).
150 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 408 (1993).
151 Id. at 1441.
152 See id. at 1445-46.
153 See id. at 1447.
154 See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Cleveland, 510 U.S. 908 (1993).
155 See Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3rd Cir. 1999)
156 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 364.
157 See id.
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and international air transportation and that these standards are
not subject to supplementation by, or variation among, jurisdic-
tions."'58 The Third Circuit, however, went on to find that state
and territorial law still control the damages remedies available
to the plaintiffs." 9
Accordingly, there now appears to be a distinct division
among the circuits, and in particular, between the Third Circuit
and the Tenth Circuit, as to whether the Federal Aviation Act
established standards that preempt the entire field of aviation
safety.
3. Industry Standards
In contesting a plaintiffs claim that the airline was negligent
in not equipping its aircraft with AEDs or enhanced medical
kits, a defendant airline may argue that it was the industry cus-
tom or standard not to carry any additional medical equipment
not mandated by the Federal Aviation Regulations. Evidence of
industry custom is relevant and admissible under state law to as-
sist the jury in determining whether a defendant airline exer-
cises the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances
of the case. 6 However, even if the defendant airline has com-
plied with industry standards, a trier of fact is not compelled to
accept industry standards as the appropriate standard of care.'16
While it is clear that the industry standard for domestic car-
rier was not to use AEDs not before July 1997, the trend is for
the use of AEDs to become the industry standard as other major
carriers, such as US Air, Delta, United, and Northwest have
moved toward their implementation. The issue of industry stan-
dard, however, may become moot should the FAA mandate
their requirement later this year.
Further, there appears to be some question as to when AEDs
were first available for use by domestic carriers on their aircraft.
158 Id. at 365. (remanding the case to the district court to determine whether
the testimony and jury instructions were consistent with the standards set out in
the FARs). See id. In particular, the Third Circuit noted that 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13(a), which states that "No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life of another," established an "overarch-
ing general standard of care under the FAA and its regulations" and that the
"reasonable standard of care" used in the trial court may not have necessarily
been incompatible with 14 C.F.R. 91.13(a). Id.
159 See id. at 375.
16 See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
161 See, e.g., The TJ. Hooper 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.).
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The issue is somewhat confusing because of the interplay of the
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and the FAA regulations
and policies regarding the use of AEDs on aircraft. One FDA
publication stated that the FDA had cleared an AED "for in-
flight use" in September 1996 and thus, in doing so, the FDA
required the manufacturer to show that the AED can function
properly in an aircraft environment without interfering with the
operation of the aircraft.1 62 Another FDA source, however, re-
ported that while the FDA regulates medical devices, such as
defibrillaters so that they are safe and effective for their in-
tended use, the FDA does not regulate whether they may be
used on aricraft. 163
162 See Nordenberg, supra note 30. The Heartstream ForeRunner AED utilized
by American Airlines did receive FDA clearance on September 10, 1996. The
ForeRunner defibrillator was given FDA clearance under the "substantial equiva-
lence" procedure as set forth in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 360c. Pursuant to such procedure,
a manufacturer may file a 510(k) Premarket Notification showing that its product
is "substantially equivalent" in its design, function and materials to predicate
products, thereby by-passing the premarket approval steps normally necessary for
new devices. (A detailed description of the Premarket Notification 510(k) pro-
cess may be found at <http://www.fdo.gov/cdrh/devadvice/314.htm>). Heart-
stream filed its 510K notification that the design, function and materials used in
the ForeRunner were substantially equivalent to predicate products. See Appen-
dix 25, 510K Summary of Safety and Effectiveness Heartstream, Inc. Forerunner
External Defibrillator and Accessories, K955628, September 10, 1996. According
to Heartstream, it subsequently submitted a request to amend the file on Septem-
ber 20, 1996, in order to include a revision of the User's Guide to include use of
the AED in aircraft. In support of its request, Heartstream submitted the testing
that it had performed to show compliance with RTCA/DO-160, "Environmental
Conditions and Testing Procedures for Airborne Equipment," which is refer-
enced in FAA Bulletin number FSAW98-05, discussed below. See Letter from Bill
Jordan, Regulatory Affairs, Hewlett-Packard, Co., to author (Sept. 13, 1999) (on
file with author). In a letter dated November 1, 1996, the FDA noted that based
upon the additional information provided by Heartstream, it did not appear that
Heartstream had significantly changed or modified the intended use of the de-
vice, but left it to Heartstream to determine whether any change to the device or
its labeling could significantly affect the device's safety or effectiveness and thus
require submission of a new 510K. See Letter from Thomas J. Callahan, Ph.D.,
Director, Division of Cardiovascular, Respiratory, and Neurological Devices, Of-
fice of Device Evaluation, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Public
Health Service, Food and Drug Administration, to Lori Glastetter, Vice President,
Regulatory Affairs and Quality Assurance, Heartstream, Inc. (Nov. 1, 1996) (on
file with author).
163 Information provided by Nancy M. Leonard at the FDA indicates that the
Office of Device Evaluation (ODE), the FDA office responsible for conducting
scientific reviews of medical devices, regulates the safety and effectiveness of
defibrillators. The FDA, however, does not regulate where these devices may be
used (e.g., airplanes). See Letter of Nancy M. Leonard, Public Health Advisor,
Communications Section HFZ-210, Office of Health and Industry Programs,
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With regard to approval for use on aircraft, the FAA treats
AEDs as portable medical devices, which are considered porta-
ble electronic devices.164 As such, these devices are subject to 14
C.F.R. § 91.21 (b) (5), which basically requires the aircraft opera-
tor to determine whether the devices will cause interference
with the navigation and communication systems of the aircraft.
4. Contributory Negligence
A question arises as to whether a carrier may rely upon the
defense of contributory negligence if a passenger knew, or
should have known, that he was not in a condition to make a
flight and still elected to do so. This issue was addressed in
Northern Trust Co. v. American Airlines, Inc.165 In that case, the
plaintiffs husband, Mr. Nardi, had a pre-existing heart disease,
but still elected to make a trip from Chicago to Acapulco. While
in Acapulco, Mr. Nardi did not feel well, and a local cardiologist
determined that he was experiencing heart failure caused by
myocardial infarction. While receiving medications for his con-
dition in Mexico, Mr. Nardi decided to return to Chicago. En
route from Acapulco, the flight made a stop in Mexico City
where there was a delay due to mechanical problems. Although
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Public Health Services, Food and
Drug Administration, to Tatha Wells (Mar. 22, 1999) (on file with author).
164 Federal Regulations allow the operation of portable devices on aircraft the
"which the operator of the aircraft has determined will not cause interference
with the navigation or communication system of that aircraft." 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.21(b)(5) (1999). FAA Bulletin FSAW 98-05 further provides that portable
electronic devices (PEDs) should be designed and tested to determine their level
of radiated emissions. Furthermore it states that devices that test within the emis-
sion levels contained in the following RTCA documents may be used without
further testing by the operator aboard the aircraft: Document Nos. RTCA/DO-
160C, "Environmental Conditions and Testing Procedures for Airborne Equip-
ment," and RTCA/DO-199, "Potential Interference to Aircraft Electric Equip-
ment from Devices Carried Aboard." Devices not meeting the emission levels
contained in the RTCA documents are required to be tested in the operator's
aircraft for electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interference with
navigation, communications, and flight control systems installed in the aircraft.
Details of the testing are set forth in Bulletin FSAW 98-05. (Note: Although Bul-
letin FSAW 98-05 expired on 3/30/99 by its own terms, the FAA has advised that
the Bulletin has been incorporated into its Principal Inspector Handbook). The
latest version of "Environmental Conditions and Testing Procedure for Airborne
Equipment" dated July 29, 1997, is Document No. DO-160D, (See also Advisory
Circular 21-16D). Further, Advisory Circular 91.21-1 entitled "Use of Portable
Electronic Devices Aboard Aircraft" also addresses these issues. A newer version
identified as Advisory Circular 91.21-1A has been prepared in draft form but as of
this date has not been issued.
165 491 N.E.2d 417 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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he was seen at a medical clinic at the Mexico City airport, Mr.
Nardi refused to go to a hospital in Mexico City. After returning
to the aircraft, Mr. Nardi began experiencing severe abdominal
pains and, pursuant to the advice of another passenger, a physi-
cian, he was taken to a hospital. Mr. Nardi died at the hospital
from organic heart disease.
The plaintiffs filed suit against American Airlines, contending
that American Airlines "failed to remove Nardi from the aircraft
when it became apparent that the stopover in Mexico City would
be longer than anticipated, and that [American Airlines] failed
to immediately transport Nardi to the Mexico City hospital
when it became apparent that Nardi's condition required medi-
cal treatment."'66 In defending, American Airlines contended
"that Nardi was contributorily negligent in not following the
physician's recommendation to enter a hospital in Acapulco
and not fly to Chicago. '' 167 At trial, the jury found that Nardi was
sixty percent contributorily negligent and awarded his widow
forty percent of her damages.1 68 However, American Airlines
appealed, contending that the trial judge erroneously excluded
the testimony of two doctors who had given Nardi warnings
about flying. 69 The plaintiffs "contended that because [their]
cause of action did not arise out of an accident, Nardi was only
required to exercise ordinary care for his safety at and after the
time he became a passenger on the flight. ' 170 "Therefore, plain-
tiffs assert[ed], the testimony of Nardi's Chicago and Mexico
physicians and other persons concerning Nardi's physical condi-
tion, his knowledge of his physical condition, and his conduct
before he became a passenger was irrelevant."171 The appellate
court disagreed, holding that
[T] he issue, therefore, is not whether plaintiffs as a matter of law
were required to establish that Nardi exercised ordinary care for
his safety before he became a passenger. Rather, the issue is
American Airlines' right to show Nardi's medical treatment, his
poor physical condition and his awareness of his illness before
the flight, as evidence of his contributory negligence. Where a plain-
tiff's injuries are allegedly caused by a defendant's negligence,
166 Id. at 422.
167 Id.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 423.
170 Id. at 423. The opinion in Northern Trust should be read in light of the
recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tseng, discussed previously herein.
See supra text accompanying note 90.
171 Northern Trust, 491 N.E. 2d at 423 (emphasis omitted).
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the defendant has the right to show that the plaintiff was contrib-
utory negligent, which question of fact is preeminently for the
jury to decide. The fact that there was no accident in this case
did not alter Nardi's responsibility to exercise due care for his
own safety. 172
Accordingly, a defendant should explore the possibility of
showing, under the applicable state law, that the passenger
failed to exercise due care for his own safety by taking a flight,
when he was either advised not to do so by medical personnel,
or was aware of facts that should convince a reasonable person
not to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no question that incidents of in-flight emergencies
will continue to increase and that the airlines must be prepared
to deal with them. This, however, is an exciting time with re-
gard to equipment becoming available that can be utilized to
address passenger medical emergencies by crew members with
nonmedical backgrounds. Further, the adoption of the Good
Samaritan Provision of the AMAA, there should be less reluc-
tance on the part of such medical personnel to respond to
emergencies of fellow passengers.
With regard to the airline's liability concerning in-flight medi-
cal emergencies, the AMAA does provide the carrier with some
protection with respect to passengers who are qualified medical
personnel that assist with medical emergencies. On the other
hand, it is clear that the air carrier cannot delegate the duty of
care it owes to its passengers. Thus, the air carrier will continue
to be ultimately responsible in the event the crew fails to carry
out its responsibility to passengers concerning medical emer-
gencies that may arise in-flight. 17
3
172 Id. at 424-25 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
173 The author wishes to thank Paul S. Weinberg with the firm of Robinson,
Donovan, Madden and Barry, P.C. in Springfield, Massachusetts for his assistance
with both the substantive content of this article and for providing a different
perspective. Mr. Weinberg represents the plaintiffs in Somes v. United Airlines,
discussed herein.
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FAA First-Aid Kit Requirements
Approved first-aid kits required by FAR § 121.309 must contain at
least the following or other approved contents:
Contents
Adhesive bandage compresses, 1 inch
Antiseptic swabs
Ammonia inhalants
Bandage compresses, 4 inch
Triangular bandage compresses, 40 inch
Arm Splint, non-inflatable
Leg Splint, non-inflatable
Roller bandage, 4 inch
Adhesive tape, 1 inch standard roll
Bandage scissors
ER IN THE SKIES
FAA Medical Kit Requirements
The approved emergency medical kit required by FAR § 121.309 must
contain as a minimum, the following appropriately maintained contents in
the specified quantities:
1986 Content Requirements 1997 Content Requirements
Sphygmomanometer Sphygmomanometer
Stethoscope Stethoscope
Airways (3 sizes) Airways (3 sizes)
Syringes Syringes
Needles Needles
50% Dextrose injection 50% Dextrose injection
Epinephrine Epinephrine
Diphenhydramine HCI Diphenhydramine HCI
Nitroglycerin tablets Nitroglycerin tablets
Basic instruction for use of the Basic instruction for use of the
drugs in the kit. drugs in the kit.
Protective latex gloves or
equivalent.
1999]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE116
.1
Z Z o !Ecq -





E . - -  " '










U. . - - _ ," . '
5 2 . .
ER IN THE SKIES
&o V'4 "~ - V' VV C - -- - - - 0 " n 10 o tC'1 V-
C
tOl Cl Cl - --- Cl - Cl -

















118 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE




u W"U0. bC M "
M - 4 AU c 4M( -C




ct ~ ~ cc0v ci
ER IN THE SKIES
THE AVIATION MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1998
SUBPART III - SAFETY
CHAPTER 447 - SAFETY REGULATION
§ 44701. General requirements
Section 1. Short Title.
This Act may be cited as the "Aviation Medical Assistance Act
of 1998."
Sec. 2. Medical Kit Equipment and Training.
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
Act [April 24, 1998], the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall reevaluate regulations regarding: (1) the
equipment required to be carried in medical kits of aircraft op-
erated by air carriers; and (2) the training required of flight at-
tendants in the use of such equipment, and, if the Administrator
determines that such regulations should be modified as a result
of such reevaluation, shall issue a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing to modify such regulations.
Sec. 3. Reports Regarding Deaths on Aircraft.
(a) In general.-During the 1-year period begin-
ning on the 9 0th day following the date of the enact-
ment of this Act [April 24, 1998], a major air carrier
shall make a good faith effort to obtain, and shall sub-
mit quarterly reports to the Administrator of the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration on, the following:
(1) The number of persons who died on
aircraft of the air carrier, including any per-
son who was declared dead after being re-
moved from such an aircraft as a result of a
medical incident that occurred on such
aircraft.
(2) The age of each such person.
(3) Any information concerning cause of
death that is available at the time such person
died on the aircraft or is removed from the
aircraft or that subsequently becomes known
to the air carrier.
(4) Whether or not the aircraft was di-
verted as a result of the death or incident.
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(5) Such other information as the Ad-
ministrator may request as necessary to aid in
a decision as to whether or not to require au-
tomatic external defibrillators in airports or
on aircraft operated by air carriers, or both.
(b) Format.-The Administrator may specify a for-
mat for reports to be submitted under this section.
Sec. 4. Decision on Automatic External Defibrillators.
(a) In general.-Not later than 120 days after the
last day of the 1-year period described in section 3, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall make a decision on whether or not to require au-
tomatic external defibrillators on passenger aircraft op-
erated by air carriers and whether or not to require
automatic external defibrillators at airports.
(b) Form of decision.-A decision under this sec-
tion shall be in the form of a notice of proposed
rulemaking requiring automatic external defibrillators
in airports or on passenger aircraft operated by air car-
riers, or both, or a recommendation to Congress for
legislation requiring such defibrillators or a notice in
the Federal Register that such defibrillators should not
be required in airports or on such aircraft. If a deci-
sion under this section is in the form of a notice of
proposed rulemaking, the Administrator shall make a
final decision not later than the 120 h day following the
date on which comments are due on the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking.
(c) Contents.-If the Administrator decides that
automatic external defibrillators should be required.-
(1) on passenger aircraft operated by air
carriers, the proposed rulemaking or recom-
mendation shall include.-
(A) the size of the aircraft on
which such defibrillators should be
required;
(B) the class flights (whether in-
terstate, overseas, or foreign air
transportation or any combination
thereof) on which such defibrillators
should be required;
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(C) the training that should be
required for air carrier personnel in
the use of such defibrillators; and
(D) the associated equipment
and medication that should be re-
quired to be carried in the aircraft
medical kit; and
(2) at airports, the proposed rulemaking
or recommendation shall include.-
(A) the size of the airport at
which such defibrillators should be
required;
(B) the training that should be
required for airport personnel in
the use of such defibrillators; and
(C) the associated equipment
and medication that should be re-
quired at the airport.
(d) Limitation.-The Administrator may not re-
quire automatic external defibrillators on helicopters
and on aircraft with a maximum payload capacity (as
defined in section 119.3 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations) of 7,500 pounds or less.
(e) Special rule.-If the Administrator decides
that automatic external defibrillators should be re-
quired at airports, the proposed rulemaking or recom-
mendation shall provide that the airports are
responsible for providing the defibrillators.
Sec. 5. Limitations on Liability.
(a) Liability of air carriers.-An air carrier shall
not be liable for damages in any action brought in a
Federal or State court arising out of the performance
of the air carrier in obtaining or attempting to obtain
the assistance of a passenger in an in-flight medical
emergency, or out of the acts or omissions of the pas-
senger rendering the assistance, if the passenger is not
an employee or agent of the carrier and the carrier in
good faith believes that the passenger is a medically
qualified individual.
(b) Liability of individuals.-An individual shall
not be liable for damages in any action brought in a
Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omis-
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sions of the individual in providing or attempting to
provide assistance in the case of an in-flight medical
emergency unless the individual, while rendering such
assistance, is guilty of gross negligence or willful
misconduct.
Sec. 6. Definitions.
"In this Act -
(1) the terms "air carrier," "aircraft," "airport," "interstate air
transportation," "overseas air transportation," and "foreign air
transportation" have the meanings such terms have under sec-
tion 40102 of title 49, United States Code;
(2) the term "major air carrier" means an air carrier certifi-
cated under section 41102 of title 49, United States Code, that
accounted for at least 1 percent of domestic scheduled-passen-
ger revenues in the 12 months ending March 31 of the most
recent year preceding the date of the enactment of this Act
[April 24, 1998], as reported to the Department of Transporta-
tion pursuant to part 241 of title 14 'of the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations; and
(3) the term "medically qualified individual" includes any per-
son who is licensed, certified, or otherwise qualified to provide
medical care in a State, including a physician, nurse, physician
assistant, paramedic, and emergency medical technician."
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In-Flight Medical Event Report
Revised October 1998
This data collection is being conducted pursuant to the Avia-
tion Medical Assistance Act of 1998. The act directs that a major
air carrier shall make a good faith effort to obtain information
on persons who die on an aircraft of the carrier including any
person who is declared dead after leaving the aircraft as a result
of a medical incident that occurred on the aircraft. Use of this
form should be restricted to reporting passenger/ffight crew
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